Straight answers.
What PlatformSmith does, what it doesn’t yet, and where your data goes. The rest is easier to show than to tell.
Last updated
What PlatformSmith does, what it doesn’t yet, and where your data goes. The rest is easier to show than to tell.
Last updated
An agentic software development platform. It is the control plane for a fleet of AI coding agents: many agents, many services, one record, and approval gates wherever you want them.
Claude Code and Codex are the agents. PlatformSmith is what runs them together. It splits one piece of work across services, routes and records every message between agents, and keeps a run waiting for your decision for as long as it takes. A coding assistant helps one developer in one repository. This runs the whole fleet.
Claude Code and Codex. You can mix them in the same run, with Claude Code on one service and Codex on another.
Yes, that is what it was built for. A run can fan out across every repository in a workspace, one agent per service, and barriers hold the group until the contract between services is agreed.
How a run works →Wherever your team already asks: Slack, GitHub, Jira, Linear, a schedule, the API, or an MCP client such as Claude, Cursor or ChatGPT. Every request is checked against your roles first, and your tracker keeps priority, assignee and sprint.
What you let it. Approval gates are explicit steps in a run; a run parks at one for up to seven days and resumes where it stopped. A run the system starts by itself, from a schedule or an alert, can’t change anything. Only a request from a real person carries that authority.
Yes. Send input to a live session, stop a session, or end a whole run. The work sits on a git branch, so a developer can pick it up from where it stopped.
The important ones are enforced by the platform, not by the prompt. Which work item a run belongs to is decided by the control plane, never claimed by the agent; the tools an agent may call are granted per session, and a reviewing agent gets read-only ones; access is deny-by-default. No guardrail can yet stop an agent from being misled by something it reads. See prompt injection below.
Yes. Agents never talk to each other directly. Every message goes through the platform and can be replayed, and each output is an artifact attributed to the agent that made it and the definition it worked to. You approve artifacts, not a transcript.
Yes. Each team writes down how it works (prompts, subagents, skills, hooks and connectors), layered from company down to project. Access is role-based down to the workspace.
The real one. The runtime goes inside your own container image and your service runs beneath it, so agents test against the real thing. A fix is rebuilt and swapped in underneath the running service. The pod never restarts, and the build runs before anything stops, so a broken build changes nothing.
The runtimes, where your code executes, run on your infrastructure. The control plane is ours, in AWS Ireland (eu-west-1). Your side dials out over one outbound connection; we never dial in.
Shared responsibility model →Agent calls go straight from your runtime to your model provider. That traffic never passes through us. We do keep a full session transcript in the EU so you can watch, resume and review, and it contains code. It is not redacted yet.
Privacy policy, section 2 →You bring them. They are encrypted at rest, bound to the person who connected them, kept out of our logs, and delivered to your runtime when a session starts. Scope them narrowly, because a credential is the limit of what an agent can reach.
Privacy policy, section 2A →No. Not ours, and not anyone else’s. Your model provider’s retention and training terms are the ones on your own account with them, so you can read them yourself.
Our staff can see metadata (what happened and when) as part of normal support. Reading content needs a stated reason and your consent for that incident. And your session content never goes into our own AI tools.
Staff access policy →Unsolved, here and everywhere. The best control today is narrow credential scope and reviewing work before it matters. We say so on a public page.
Known limitations →Yes. Ask and we delete it, then confirm. A disconnected credential leaves live systems immediately; encrypted backups age out as they rotate.
Yes. Bring an API key, or a setup token you generate with your provider’s own CLI; your provider bills you directly and we never resell access. For team-wide or unattended runs, use an API key.
Nothing during the beta. You pay your model provider and run your own compute.
That is the demo: thirty minutes, a real multi-service change, nothing pre-recorded.
Not yet. No SOC 2 audit, no ISO 27001 certification, no external penetration test, and no SSO/SAML or multi-factor authentication. Sign-in is email and password, or Google or GitHub.
Known limitations →Not yet. It is a free beta in a single region with no redundancy and no service level agreement.
Not in the platform yet. Model spend sits on your own provider account, where that provider’s limits apply, and we don’t cap runtime CPU, memory or disk, so size the host accordingly.
No. Whatever cover you have comes from your agreement with your model provider.
Terms, section 4A →Not today. That control is yours. What a runtime can reach is decided by your network, so segment it on your side.
Thirty minutes, a real multi-service change, nothing pre-recorded.